Application isolation with AppArmor – part II February 8, 2013
Posted by jdstrand in canonical, security, ubuntu.add a comment
Last time I discussed AppArmor, gave some background and some information on how it can be used. This time I’d like to discuss how AppArmor is used within Ubuntu. The information in this part applies to Ubuntu 12.10 and later, and unless otherwise noted, Ubuntu 12.04 LTS (and because we also push our changes into Debian, much of this will apply to Debian as well).
/etc/apparmor.d
- Ubuntu follows the upstream policy layout and naming conventions and uses the abstractions extensively. A few abstractions are Ubuntu-specific and they are prefixed with ‘ubuntu’. Eg /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/ubuntu-browsers.
- Ubuntu encourages the use of the include files in /etc/apparmor.d/local in any shipped profiles. This allows administrators to make profile additions and apply overrides without having to change the shipped profile (will need to reload the profile with apparmor_parser, see /etc/apparmor.d/local/README for more information)
- All profiles in Ubuntu use ‘#include <tunables/global>’, which pulls in a number of tunables: ‘@{PROC}’ from ‘tunables/proc’, ‘@{HOME}’ and ‘@{HOMEDIRS}’ from ‘tunables/home’ and @{multiarch} from ‘tunables/multiarch’
- In addition to ‘tunables/home’, Ubuntu utilizes the ‘tunables/home.d/ubuntu’ file so that ‘@{HOMEDIRS}’ is preseedable at installation time, or adjustable via ‘sudo dpkg-reconfigure apparmor’
- Binary caches in /etc/apparmor.d/cache are used to speed up boot time.
- Ubuntu uses the /etc/apparmor.d/disable and /etc/apparmor.d/force-complain directories. Touching (or symlinking) a file with the same name as the profile in one of these directories will cause AppArmor to either skip policy load (eg disable/usr.sbin.rsyslogd) or load in complain mode (force-complain/usr.bin.firefox)
Boot
Policy load happens in 2 stages during boot:
- within the job of a package with an Upstart job file
- via the SysV initscript (/etc/init.d/apparmor)
For packages with an Upstart job and an AppArmor profile (eg, cups), the job file must load the AppArmor policy prior to execution of the confined binary. As a convenience, the /lib/init/apparmor-profile-load helper is provided to simplify Upstart integration. For packages that ship policy but do not have a job file (eg, evince), policy must be loaded sometime before application launch, which is why stage 2 is needed. Stage 2 will (re)load all policy. Binary caches are used in both stages unless it is determined that policy must be recompiled (eg, booting a new kernel).
dhclient is a corner case because it needs to have its policy loaded very early in the boot process (ie, before any interfaces are brought up). To accommodate this, the /etc/init/network-interface-security.conf upstart job file is used.
For more information on why this implementation is used, please see the upstart mailing list.
Packaging
AppArmor profiles are shipped as Debian conffiles (ie, the package manager treats them specially during upgrades). AppArmor profiles in Ubuntu should use an include directive to include a file from /etc/apparmor.d/local so that local site changes can be made without modifying the shipped profile. When a package ships an AppArmor profile, it is added to /etc/apparmor.d then individually loaded into the kernel (with caching enabled). On package removal, any symlinks/files in /etc/apparmor.d/disable, /etc/apparmor.d/force-complain and /etc/apparmor.d are cleaned up. Developers can use dh_apparmor to aid in shipping profiles with their packages.
Profiles and applications
Ubuntu ships a number of AppArmor profiles. The philosophy behind AppArmor profiles on Ubuntu is that the profile should add a meaningful security benefit while at the same time not introduce regressions in default or common functionality. Because it is all too easy for a security mechanism to be turned off completely in order to get work done, Ubuntu won’t ship overly restrictive profiles. If we can provide a meaningful security benefit with an AppArmor profile in the default install while still maintaining functionality for the vast majority of users, we may ship an enforcing profile. Unfortunately, because applications are not designed to run under confinement or are designed to do many things, it can be difficult to confine these applications while still maintaining usability. Sometimes we will ship disabled-by-default profiles so that people can opt into them if desired. Usually profiles are shipped in the package that provides the confined binary (eg, tcpdump ships its own AppArmor profile). Some in progress profiles are also offered in the apparmor-profiles package and are in complain mode by default. When filing AppArmor bugs in Ubuntu, it is best to file the bug against the application that ships the profile.
In addition to shipped profiles, some applications have AppArmor integration built in or have AppArmor confinement applied in a non-standard way.
Libvirt
An AppArmor sVirt driver is provided and enabled by default for libvirt managed QEMU virtual machines. This provides strong guest isolation and userspace host protection for virtual machines. AppArmor profiles are dynamically generated in /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt and usually you won’t have to worry about AppArmor confinement. If needed, profiles for the individual machines can be adjusted in /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-<uuid> or in all virtual machines in /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu. See /usr/share/doc/libvirt-bin/README.Debian.gz for details.
LXC
LXC in Ubuntu uses AppArmor to help make sure files in the container cannot access security-sensitive files on the host. lxc-start is confined by its own restricted profile which allows mounting in the container’s tree and, just before executing the container’s init, transitioning to the container’s own profile. See LXC in precise and beyond for details. Note, currently the libvirt-lxc sVirt driver does not have AppArmor support (confusingly, libvirt-lxc is a different project than LXC, but there are longer term plans to integrate the two and/or add AppArmor support to libvirt-lxc).
Firefox
Ubuntu ships a disabled-by-default profile for Firefox. While it is known to work well in the default Ubuntu installation, Firefox, like all browsers, is a very complex piece of software that can do much more than simply surf web pages so enabling the profile in the default install could affect the overall usability of Firefox in Ubuntu. The goals of the profile are to provide a good usability experience with strong additional protection. The profile allows for the use of plugins and extensions, various helper applications, and access to files in the user’s HOME directory, removable media and network filesystems. The profile prevents execution of arbitrary code, malware, reading and writing to sensitive files such as ssh and gpg keys, and writing to files in the user’s default PATH. It also prevents reading of system and kernel files. All of this provides a level of protection exceeding that of normal UNIX permissions. Additionally, the profile’s use of includes allows for great flexibility for tightly confining firefox. /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.firefox is a very restricted profile, but includes both /etc/apparmor.d/local/usr.bin.firefox and /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/ubuntu-browsers.d/firefox. /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/ubuntu-browsers.d/firefox contains other include files for tasks such as multimedia, productivity, etc and the file can be manipulated via the aa-update-browser command to add or remove functionality as needed.
Chromium
A complain-mode profile for chromium-browser is available in the apparmor-profiles package. It uses the same methodology as the Firefox profile (see above) with a strict base profile including /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/ubuntu-browsers.d/chromium-browser whichcan then include any number of additional abstractions (also configurable via aa-update-browser).
Lightdm guest session
The guest session in Ubuntu is protected via AppArmor. When selecting the guest session, Lightdm will transition to a restrictive profile that disallows access to others’ files.
libapache2-mod-apparmor
The libapache2-mod-apparmor package ships a disabled-by-default profile in /etc/apparmor.d/usr.lib.apache2.mpm-prefork.apache2. This profile provides a permissive profile for Apache itself but allows the administrator to add confinement policy for individual web applications as desired via AppArmor’s change_hat() mechanism (note, apache2-mpm-prefork must be used) and an example profile for phpsysinfo is provided in the apparmor-profiles package. For more information on how to use AppArmor with Apache, please see /etc/apparmor.d/usr.lib.apache2.mpm-prefork.apache2 as well as the upstream documentation.
PAM
AppArmor also has a PAM module which allows great flexibility in setting up policies for different users. The idea behind pam_apparmor is simple: when someone uses a confined binary (such as login, su, sshd, etc), that binary will transition to an AppArmor role via PAM. Eg, if ‘su’ is configured for use with pam_apparmor, when a user invokes ‘su’, PAM is consulted and when the PAM session is started, pam_apparmor will change_hat() to a hat that matches the username, the primary group, or the DEFAULT hat (configurable). These hats (typically) provide rudimentary policy which declares the transition to a role profile when the user’s shell is started. The upstream documentation has an example of how to put this all together for ‘su’, unconfined admin users, a tightly confined user, and somewhat confined default users.
aa-notify
aa-notify is a very simple program that can alert you when there are denials on the system. aa-notify will report any new AppArmor denials by consulting /var/log/kern.log (or /var/log/audit/audit.log if auditd is installed). For desktop users who install apparmor-notify, aa-notify is started on session start via /etc/X11/Xsession.d/90apparmor-notify and will watch the logs for any new denials and report them via notify-osd. Server users can add something like ‘/usr/bin/aa-notify -s 1 -v’ to their shell startup files (eg, ~/.profile) to show any AppArmor denials within the last day whenever they login. See ‘man 8 aa-notify’ for details.
Current limitations
For all AppArmor can currently do and all the places it is used in Ubuntu, there are limitations in AppArmor 2.8 and lower (ie, what is in Ubuntu and other distributions). Right now, it is great for servers, network daemons and tools/utilities that process untrusted input. While it can provide a security benefit to client applications, there are currently a number of gaps in this area:
- Access to the DBus system bus is on/off and there is no mediation of the session bus or any other buses that rely on Unix abstract sockets, such as the accessibility bus
- AppArmor does not provide environment filtering beyond having the ability to clear the very limited set of glibc secure-exec variables
- Display management mediation is not present (eg, it doesn’t protect against X snooping)
- Networking mediation is too coarse-grained (eg you can allow ‘tcp’ but cannot restrict the binding port, integrate with a firewall or utilize secmark)
- LXC/containers support is functional, but not complete (eg, it doesn’t allow different host and container policy for the same binary at the same time)
- AppArmor doesn’t currently integrate with other client technologies that might be useful (eg gnome-keyring, signon/gnome-online-accounts and gsettings) and there is no facility to dynamically update a profile via a user prompt like a file/open dialog
Next time I’ll discuss ongoing and future work to address these limitations.
Mirror, mirror… January 15, 2013
Posted by jdstrand in security, ubuntu.4 comments
Recently I wanted to mirror traffic from one interface to another. There is a cool utility from Martin Roesch (of Snort fame) called daemonlogger. It’s use is pretty simple (note I created the ‘daemonlogger user and group on my Ubuntu system since I wanted it to drop privileges after starting):
$ sudo /usr/bin/daemonlogger -u daemonlogger \
-g daemonlogger -i eth0 -o eth1
Sure enough, examing tcpcump output, anything coming in on eth0 was mirrored to eth1. I then used a crossover cable and used tcpdump on the other system and it all worked as advertised. This could be very useful for an IDS.
Then I thought how cool it would be to do this for multiple interfaces, but then I quickly realized that would be confusing for whatever was trying to interpret that traffic. I read that someone used a combination of daemonlogger and vtun for a remote snort monitor to work in EC2, which got me playing….
In my test environment, I again used a crossover cable to connect two systems (let’s call them the ‘server’ and the ‘monitor’). The server system runs vtund. The monitor system then connects as a vtun client. When this happens, tap devices are created on the server and the monitor. The vtund server is setup to start daemonlogger on connect to mirror the traffic from eth0 to the tap0 device. The monitor system can then listen on the tap device and get all the traffic. I then created a second vtun tunnel and mirrored from eth1 to tap1. The monitor could monitor on both tap devices. Neat!
To do accomplish this, I used this /etc/vtund.conf on the server:options {
type stand;
port 5000;
syslog daemon;
ifconfig /sbin/ifconfig;
}
default {
type ether;
proto udp;
compress no;
encrypt no;
multi yes;
keepalive yes;
srcaddr {
iface eth2;
addr 10.0.3.1;
};
}
internal {
password pass0;
device tap0;
up {
ifconfig "%d up";
program /usr/bin/daemonlogger "-u daemonlogger -g daemonlogger -i eth0 -o %d";
};
down {
ifconfig "%d down";
program /usr/bin/pkill "-f -x '/usr/bin/daemonlogger -u daemonlogger -g daemonlogger -i eth0 -o %d'";
};
}
external {
password pass1;
device tap1;
up {
ifconfig "%d up";
program /usr/bin/daemonlogger "-u daemonlogger -g daemonlogger -i eth1 -o %d";
};
down {
ifconfig "%d down";
program /usr/bin/pkill "-f -x '/usr/bin/daemonlogger -u daemonlogger -g daemonlogger -i eth1 -o %d'";
};
}
Ther server’s /etc/default/vtun has:RUN_SERVER=yes
SERVER_ARGS="-P 5000"
And here is the client /etc/vtund.conf:options {
port 5000;
ifconfig /sbin/ifconfig;
}
default {
type ether;
proto udp;
compress no;
encrypt no;
persist yes;
}
internal {
device tap0;
password pass0;
up {
ifconfig "%d up";
};
down {
ifconfig "%d down";
};
}
external {
device tap1;
password pass1;
up {
ifconfig "%d up";
};
down {
ifconfig "%d down";
};
}
The monitor system’s /etc/default/vtun looks like this:CLIENT0_NAME=internal
CLIENT0_HOST=10.0.2.1
CLIENT1_NAME=external
CLIENT1_HOST=10.0.2.1
With the above, I was able to start suricata (a snort-compatible rewrite that is multithreaded) to listen to both tap0 and tap1 on the monitoring system and see all the traffic. Very cool. :)
Now, this isn’t optimized for anything– sending 2 interfaces’ worth of traffic through one interface is likely going to result in droppoed packets to the monitor if the links are busy. Could maybe use compression to help there. Also, the server really needs to have an extra interface for vtun traffic that isn’t mirrored, otherwise you end up mirroring the vtun traffic itself (in my test environment, eth2 on the server used 10.0.2.1 and the montior used 10.0.2.2). Finally, vtun doesn’t offer any meaningful line encryption so if you are doing this for anything resembling production, you’re going to want to use a dedicated network segment between the server and the monitor (a crossover cable worked fine in my test environment).
Enjoy!
Application isolation with AppArmor – part I January 11, 2013
Posted by jdstrand in canonical, security, ubuntu.Tags: mandatory access control, security, ubuntu
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A lot of exciting work has been going on with AppArmor and this multipart series will discuss where AppArmor is now, how it is currently used in Ubuntu and how it fits into the larger application isolation story moving forward.
Brief History and Background
AppArmor is a Mandatory Access Control (MAC) system which is a Linux Security Module (LSM) to confine programs to a limited set of resources. AppArmor’s security model is to bind access control attributes to programs rather than to users. AppArmor confinement is provided via profiles loaded into the kernel. AppArmor profiles can be in one of two modes: enforcement and complain. Profiles loaded in enforcement mode will result in enforcement of the policy defined in the profile as well as reporting policy violation attempts (either via syslog or auditd) such that what is not allowed in policy is denied. Profiles in complain mode will not enforce policy but instead report policy violation attempts. AppArmor is typically deployed on systems as a targeted policy where only some (eg high risk) applications have an AppArmor profile defined, but it also supports system wide policy.
Some defining characteristics of AppArmor are that it:
- is root strong
- is path-based
- allows for mixing of enforcement and complain mode profiles
- uses include files to ease development
- is very lightweight in terms of resources
- is easy to learn
- is relatively easy to audit
AppArmor is an established technology first seen in Immunix and later integrated into SUSE and Ubuntu and their derivatives. AppArmor is also available in Debian, Mandriva, Arch, PLD, Pardus and others. Core AppArmor functionality is in the mainline Linux kernel starting with 2.6.36. AppArmor maintenance and development is ongoing.
An example AppArmor profile
Probably the easiest way to describe what AppArmor does and how it works is to look at an example, in this case the profile for tcpdump on Ubuntu 12.04 LTS:
#include <tunables/global>
/usr/sbin/tcpdump {
#include <abstractions/base>
#include <abstractions/nameservice>
#include <abstractions/user-tmp>
capability net_raw,
capability setuid,
capability setgid,
capability dac_override,
network raw,
network packet,
# for -D
capability sys_module,
@{PROC}/bus/usb/ r,
@{PROC}/bus/usb/** r,
# for finding an interface
@{PROC}/[0-9]*/net/dev r,
/sys/bus/usb/devices/ r,
/sys/class/net/ r,
/sys/devices/**/net/* r,
# for tracing USB bus, which libpcap supports
/dev/usbmon* r,
/dev/bus/usb/ r,
/dev/bus/usb/** r,
# for init_etherarray(), with -e
/etc/ethers r,
# for USB probing (see libpcap-1.1.x/
# pcap-usb-linux.c:probe_devices())
/dev/bus/usb/**/[0-9]* w,
# for -z
/bin/gzip ixr,
/bin/bzip2 ixr,
# for -F and -w
audit deny @{HOME}/.* mrwkl,
audit deny @{HOME}/.*/ rw,
audit deny @{HOME}/.*/** mrwkl,
audit deny @{HOME}/bin/ rw,
audit deny @{HOME}/bin/** mrwkl,
owner @{HOME}/ r,
owner @{HOME}/** rw,
# for -r, -F and -w
/**.[pP][cC][aA][pP] rw,
# for convenience with -r (ie, read
# pcap files from other sources)
/var/log/snort/*log* r,
/usr/sbin/tcpdump r,
# Site-specific additions and overrides. See
# local/README for details.
#include <local/usr.sbin.tcpdump>
}
This profile is representative of traditional AppArmor profiling for a program that processes untrusted input over the network. As can be seen:
- profiles are simple text files
- comments are supported in the profile
- absolute paths as well as file globbing can be used when specifying file access
- various access controls for files are present. From the profile we see ‘r’ (read), ‘w’ (write), ‘m’ (memory map as executable), ‘k’ (file locking), ‘l’ (creation hard links), and ‘ix’ to execute another program with the new program inheriting policy. Other access rules also exists such as ‘Px’ (execute under another profile, after cleaning the environment), ‘Cx’ (execute under a child profile, after cleaning the environment), and ‘Ux’ (execute unconfined, after cleaning the environment)
- access controls for capabilities are present
- access controls for networking are present
- explicit deny rules are supported, to override other allow rules (eg access to @{HOME}/bin/bad.sh is denied with auditing due to ‘audit deny @{HOME}/bin/** mrwkl,’ even though general access to @{HOME} is permitted with ‘@{HOME}/** rw,’)
- include files are supported to ease development and simplify profiles (ie #include <abstractions/base>, #include <abstractions/nameservice>, #include <abstractions/user-tmp>, #include <local/usr.sbin.tcpdump>)
- variables can be defined and manipulated outside the profile (#include <tunables/global> for @{PROC} and @{HOME})
- AppArmor profiles are fairly easy to read and audit
Complete information on the profile language can be found in ‘man 5 apparmor.d’ as well as the AppArmor wiki.
Updating and creating profiles
AppArmor uses the directory heirarchy as described in policy layout, but most of the time, you are either updating an existing profile or creating a new one and so the files you most care about are in /etc/apparmor.d.
The AppArmor wiki has a lot of information on debugging and updating existing profiles. AppArmor denials are logged to /var/log/kern.log (or /var/log/audit/audit.log if auditd is installed). If an application is misbehaving and you think it is because of AppArmor, check the logs first. If there is an AppArmor denial, adjust the policy in /etc/apparmor.d, then reload the policy and restart the program like so:
$ sudo apparmor_parser -R /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.foo $ sudo apparmor_parser -a /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.foo $ <restart application>
Oftentimes it is enough to just reload the policy without unloading/loading the profile or restarting the application:
$ sudo apparmor_parser -r /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.foo
Creating a profile can be done either with tools or by hand. Due to the current pace and focus of development, the tools are somewhat behind and lack some features. It is generally recommended that you profile by hand instead.
When profiling, keep in mind that:
- AppArmor provides an additional permission check to traditional Discretionary Access Controls (DAC). DAC is always checked in addition to the AppArmor permission checks. As such, AppArmor cannot override DAC to provide more access than what would be normally allowed.
- AppArmor normalizes path names. It resolves symlinks and considers each hard link as a different access path.
- AppArmor evaluates file access by pathname rather than using on disk labeling. This eases profiling since AppArmor handles all the labelling behind the scenes.
- Deny rules are evaluated after allow rules and cannot be overridden by an allow rule.
- Creation of files requires the create permission (implied by w) on the path to be created. Separate rules for writing to the directory of where the file resides are not required. Deletion works like creation but requires the delete permission (implied by w). Copy requires ‘r’ of the source with create and write at the destination (implied by w). Move is like copy, but also requires delete at source.
- The profile must be loaded before an application starts for the confinement to take effect. You will want to make sure that you load policy during boot before any confined daemons or applications.
- The kernel will rate limit AppArmor denials which can cause problems while profiling. You can avoid this be installing auditd or by adjusting rate limiting in the kernel:
$ sudo sysctl -w kernel.printk_ratelimit=0
Resources
There is a lot of documentation on AppArmor (though some is still in progress):
- AppArmor upstream documentation
- Debugging AppArmor in Ubuntu
- apparmor.d man page
- apparmor man page
- Ubuntu AppArmor Documentation
Next time I’ll discuss the specifics of how Ubuntu uses AppArmor in the distribution.
Thanks to Seth Arnold and John Johansen for their review.
OpenSSH and multiple identities November 29, 2012
Posted by jdstrand in security, ubuntu.add a comment
While this may be old news to some, I only just now figured out how to conveniently use multiple identities in OpenSSH. I have several ssh keys, but only two that I want to use with the agent: one for personal use and one for work. I’d like to be able to not specify which identity to use on the command line most of the time and just use ssh like so:
$ ssh <personal>
$ ssh <work>
$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/other.id_rsa <other>
where the first two use the agent with ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/work.id_rsa respectively, and the last does not use the agent. ‘man ssh_config’ tells me that the agent looks at all the different IdentityFile configuration directives (in order) and also the IdentitiesOnly option. Therefore, I can set up my ~/.ssh/config to have something like:
# This makes it so that only my default identity
# and my work identity are used by the agent
IdentitiesOnly yes
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/work.id_rsa
# Default to using my work key with work domains
Host *.work1.com *.work2.com
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/work.id_rsa
With the above, it all works the way I want. Cool! :)
A fun hack: triggered reverse ssh connections for remote access to anywhere November 8, 2010
Posted by jdstrand in security, ubuntu.10 comments
So, like a lot people, I get asked to install Ubuntu on friend’s and family’s computers. I talk to them about what their use cases are and more often than not (by far) I install it on their systems. That’s cool. What is less cool is tech support for said installation. Not that I mind doing it or that there is a lot to do, but what becomes problematic is when they go home and are sitting behind their NAT router from their ISP, and I can’t just connect to them to fix something I forgot or to help them out of a jam. Before I go any farther let me say that what I am going to describe is never done on machines without the owner’s permission and that I am always upfront in that my account on his/her machine is an administrative account that has access to everything on the system (barring any encryption they use, of course). I should also mention that what I am describing is more in the ‘fun hack that other people might like’ category, and not in the ‘serious systems administration’ category. In other words, this is total crack, but it is fun crack. :)
Now, there are a lot of ways to do this, and I have tried some and surely missed many others. Here are a few I’ve tried:
- Giving realtime tech support over the phone
- Giving realtime tech support over some secure/encrypted chat mechanism
- Email support
- OpenSSH access from my machine to theirs, including adjusting their router for port forwarding
- VPN access from their machine to my network, at which point I can OpenSSH to their machine
Rather than going through a comparison of all the different techniques, let’s just say they all have issues: realtime support almost always entails describing some obscure incantation to fix the problem, which is neither confidence inspiring for them and is extremely time consuming. Email is too slow. Routers get reset and straight OpenSSH doesn’t work when they are away from home. VPN access is not bad, especially with the use of OpenVPN client and server certificates. It has the added benefit of being opt-in by the user, and is easy to use with the network-manager-openvpn-gnome package. It is probably the most legitimate form of access, and should be highly considered, especially for corporate environments. The only real issues are that some draconian networks will block this VPN traffic and that my IP happens to change so they have to fiddle with their connection setting. So I started doing something different.
Remotely triggered reverse OpenSSH connections
The basic idea is this: on the client install OpenSSH, harden it a bit, install a firewall so that no one can connect to it, then create a cron job to poll an HTTP server you have access to for an IP address to connect to, then create a reverse SSH connection to that IP address. If this sounds a little shady and a bit like a botnet, well, you’d be right, but again, I did ask for permission first. :)
So, more specifically, on the remote machine (ie, the one you want to administer):
- Install openssh-server and set /etc/ssh/sshd_config with the following:
# Force key authentication (ie, no passwords)Obviously, you will need to copy your ssh key over to this machine (man ssh-copy-id) before restarting OpenSSH and putting the above into effect.
PasswordAuthentication no
# Only allow logins to my account
AllowUsers me
- Setup a firewall. Eg:
$ sudo ufw enable - Create some passwordless ssh keys. Eg:
$ ssh-keygen -f revssh.id_rsa - Create a script to poll some HTTP server, then create the reverse connection (this is an abridged script. I’ve omitted error checking and locking for brevity):
#!/bin/sh
hname=`hostname | cut -f 1 -d '.'`
ip=`elinks -no-home -dump "http://your.web.server/$hname" | head -1 | awk '{print $1}' | egrep '^[1-9][0-9\.]*$'` || {
#echo "Could not obtain ip" >&2
exit 0
}
echo "Connecting to $ip"
# we use StrictHostKeyChecking=no so that keys gets added without prompting
ssh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no -i $HOME/.ssh/revssh.id_rsa -p 8080 -NR 3333:localhost:22 revssh@"$ip" sleep 30 || true
To remotely administer a machine, create a file on the server with the name of the hostname of the client to have only the external IP address of your network in it, and then the remote client will pick it up and try to setup a reverse ssh connection on port 8080 (usually open even on the most draconian firewalls, but you could also use 53/tcp, 80/tcp or 443/tcp), after which you can connect to the remote machine with something like:$ ssh -t -p 3333 localhost
Caveats
This is hardly perfect. For one thing, the client is polling an HTTP server so it can easily be man-in-the-middled, but that isn’t a big deal because even if the attacker had full knowledge of this technique, all it gives is a connection to OpenSSH on the client, which is configured to only allow connections from ‘me’ and with my ssh key. This could of course be fixed by connecting with HTTPS and using connection.ssl.cert_verify=1 with elinks. Similarly, the HTTP server could be subverted and under attacker control. For the client, this is no different than the MITM attack in that the attacker really doesn’t have much to work with due to the OpenSSH configuration. Also, the client completely ignores the fingerprint of the server it is connecting to, but again, not huge deal because of our OpenSSH configuration on the client, but you will need to be extra careful in checking fingerprints when connecting to the reverse connection.
You need to remember to update your webserver (ie, just remove the file) so the client isn’t always trying to connect to you. Also, it is somewhat inconvenient that when you logout the reverse connection is still there, but instead of using ‘exit’ to logout of the remote machine, use something like: $ kill -9 `ps auxww | grep [s]sh | grep 3333 | awk '{print $2}'`
While is it relatively easy to setup the client, it is somewhat harder to setup the initiating end. First off, you need to have a webserver that can be accessed by the client. Then you need to have the ssh server on your local machine listen on port 8080 (done either via a port redirect or a separate ssh server). You also need to setup a non-privileged ‘revssh’ user (eg, /bin/false for the shell, a disabled password, etc) on your machine. If you are behind a firewall/router you need to allow connections through your firewall to your machine so that the connection to port 8080 from the client is not blocked. Finally, if you remotely administer multiple clients you will want to keep track of their ssh fingerprints, because when you connect to ‘-p 3333 localhost’ they will conflict with each other (most annoying, but workable). I have written a ‘revssh_allow’ script to automate the above for me (not included, as it is highly site-specific). It will: fire up an sshd server on port 8080 that is specially configured for this purpose, adjust my local firewall to open port 8080/tcp from the client, connect to my router to set up the port redirection to my machine, then poll (via ‘netstat -atn | grep “:3333.*LISTEN”‘) for the connection from the client, then remind me how to connect to the client and how to properly kill the connection.
Summary
So yeah, this is a fun hack. Is it something to put in production? Probably not. Does it work for administering friend’s and family’s computers? Absolutely, but I’ll have to see how well it works over the long haul.
Have fun!
Proposed chromium-browser available for Lucid July 8, 2010
Posted by jdstrand in security, ubuntu.add a comment
A proposed security update for chromium-browser on Ubuntu 10.04 LTS is available. If you are able, please test and comment in https://launchpad.net/bugs/602142.
Security update for chromium-browser in lucid-proposed June 10, 2010
Posted by jdstrand in security, ubuntu.add a comment
Fabien Tassin (fta) has prepared a security update for chromium-browser for Ubuntu 10.04 LTS (Lucid Lynx). Please test and provide positive and/or negative feedback in: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/chromium-browser/+bug/591474.
This update addresses the following upstream issues:
http://googlechromereleases.blogspot.com/2010/06/stable-channel-update.html.
Thanks Fabien!
Chromium saved passwords May 18, 2010
Posted by jdstrand in security, ubuntu.6 comments
I make use of the Master Password feature in Firefox. While not on by default, when enabled this feature encrypts your Firefox saved passwords on disk, and Firefox will prompt you when you need access to a saved password. When your browser is not running, your passwords are safe. There is a tool to try to brute force your master password if your machine is stolen, but as long as you use a strong password you should be ok (or at the very least, give you time to change them). For more information, see http://kb.mozillazine.org/Master_password.
This is a nice feature, and one which Chromium lacks. If you let Chromium save your passwords, they are stored in the ‘~/.config/chromium/Default/Web Data’ sqlite database. Displaying them is surprisingly easy (this is 5.0.342.9~r43360-0ubuntu2 on Ubuntu 10.04 LTS, newer versions may save them somewhere else):
$ echo 'SELECT username_value, password_value FROM logins;' | sqlite3 ~/.config/chromium/Default/Web\ Data | grep -v '^|$'
username|password
username2|password2
As you can see, in essence your passwords are stored in plain text on your disk (though the ~/.config/chromium directory does have 0700 permissions). I won’t go into the reasons why Google hasn’t implemented this feature yet since people can read the bug, but it seems clear that:
- Google is not going to fix this anytime soon
- People need a way to protect themselves
There are some alternatives with LastPass and RoboForm, but these apparently require you to store your passwords online (I’ve not verified this personally). As it stands, there is not a way to lock your saved passwords, so I encourage Chromium users to encrypt their data using eCryptfs or LUKS full disk encryption so that at least when you turn off your computer the passwords are not readily available. In Ubuntu, you can:
- setup LUKS full disk encryption using the alternate installer
- setup an encrypted home directory in all the Desktop and Server installers (or migrate an existing home directory by using ‘ecryptfs-migrate-home’)
- setup an encrypted private directory using ‘ecryptfs-setup-private’ (if you go this route, you’ll want to move ~/.config/chromium and ~/.cache/chromium into the encrypted directory and use symlinks to point to them)
In this scenario, normal DAC permissions will protect your passwords on multiuser systems (though you’ll need to be careful about the security of backups) and encrypted disks/folders will protect them in the case of theft. As always, please be vigilant about screen locking when you leave your computer while logged in though….
ClamAV update May 7, 2010
Posted by jdstrand in security, ubuntu, ubuntu-server.1 comment so far
Upstream ClamAV pushed out an update via freshclam that crashed versions of 0.95 and earlier on 32 bit systems (Ubuntu 9.10 and earlier are affected). Upstream issued an update via freshclam within 15 minutes, but affected users’ clamd daemon will not restart automatically. People running ClamAV should check that it is still running. For details see:
http://lurker.clamav.net/message/20100507.110656.573e90d7.en.html
AppArmor sVirt security driver for libvirt November 3, 2009
Posted by jdstrand in security, ubuntu, ubuntu-server.Tags: canonical
4 comments
Background
Ubuntu has been using libvirt as part of its recommended virtualization management toolkit since Ubuntu 8.04 LTS. In short, libvirt provides a set of tools and APIs for managing virtual machines (VMs) such as creating a VM, modifying its hardware configuration, starting and stopping VMs, and a whole lot more. For more information on using libvirt in Ubuntu, see http://doc.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/serverguide/C/libvirt.html.
Libvirt greatly eases the deployment and management of VMs, but due to the fact that it has traditionally been limited to using POSIX ACLs and sometimes needs to perform privileged actions, using libvirt (or any virtualization technology for that matter) can create a security risk, especially when the guest VM isn’t trusted. It is easy to imagine a bug in the hypervisor which would allow a compromised VM to modify other guests or files on the host. Considering that when using qemu:///system the guest VM process runs as a root (this is configurable in 0.7.0 and later, but still the default in Fedora and Ubuntu 9.10), it is even more important to contain what a guest can do. To address these issues, SELinux developers created a fork of libvirt, called sVirt, which when using kvm/qemu, allows libvirt to add SELinux labels to files required for the VM to run. This work was merged back into upstream libvirt in version 0.6.1, and it’s implementation, features and limitations can be seen in a blog post by Dan Walsh and an article on LWN.net. This is inspired work, and the sVirt folks did a great job implementing it by using a plugin framework so that others could create different security drivers for libvirt.
AppArmor Security Driver for Libvirt
While Ubuntu has SELinux support, by default it uses AppArmor. AppArmor is different from SELinux and some other MAC systems available on Linux in that it is path-based, allows for mixing of enforcement and complain mode profiles, uses include files to ease development, and typically has a far lower barrier to entry than other popular MAC systems. It has been an important security feature of Ubuntu since 7.10, where CUPS was confined by AppArmor in the default installation (more profiles have been added with each new release).
Since virtualization is becoming more and more prevalent, improving the security stance for libvirt users is of primary concern. It was very natural to look at adding an AppArmor security driver to libvirt, and as of libvirt 0.7.2 and Ubuntu 9.10, users have just that. In terms of supported features, the AppArmor driver should be on par with the SELinux driver, where the vast majority of libvirt functionality is supported by both drivers out of the box.
Implementation
First, the libvirtd process is confined with a lenient profile that allows the libvirt daemon to launch VMs, change into another AppArmor profile and use virt-aa-helper to manipulate AppArmor profiles. virt-aa-helper is a helper application that can add, remove, modify, load and unload AppArmor profiles in a limited and restricted way. Specifically, libvirtd is not allowed to adjust anything in /sys/kernel/security directly, or modify the profiles for the virtual machines directly. Instead, libvirtd must use virt-aa-helper, which is itself run under a very restrictive AppArmor profile. Using this architecture helps prevent any opportunities for a subverted libvirtd to change its own profile (especially useful if the libvirtd profile is adjusted to be restrictive) or modify other AppArmor profiles on the system.
Next, there are several profiles that comprise the system:
- /etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.libvirtd
- /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.virt-aa-helper
- /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu
- /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/TEMPLATE
- /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-<uuid>
- /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-<uuid>.files
/etc/apparmor.d/usr.sbin.libvirtd and /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.virt-aa-helper define the profiles for libvirtd and virt-aa-helper (note that in libvirt 0.7.2, virt-aa-helper is located in /usr/lib/libvirt/virt-aa-helper). /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/TEMPLATE is consulted when creating a new profile when one does not already exist. /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu is the abstraction shared by all running VMs. /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-<uuid> is the unique base profile for an individual VM, and /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-<uuid>.files contains rules for the guest-specific files required to run this individual VM.
The confinement process is as follows (assume the VM has a libvirt UUID of ‘a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac’):
- When libvirtd is started, it determines if it should use a security driver. If so, it checks which driver to use (eg SELinux or AppArmor). If libvirtd is confined by AppArmor, it will use the AppArmor security driver
- When a VM is started, libvirtd decides whether to ask virt-aa-helper to create a new profile or modify an existing one. If no profile exists, libvirtd asks virt-aa-helper to generate the new base profile, in this case /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac, which it does based on /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/TEMPLATE. Notice, the new profile has a profile name that is based on the guest’s UUID. Once the base profile is created, virt-aa-helper works the same for create and modify: virt-aa-helper will determine what files are required for the guest to run (eg kernel, initrd, disk, serial, etc), updates /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac.files, then loads the profile into the kernel.
- libvirtd will proceed as normal at this point, until just before it forks a qemu/kvm process, it will call aa_change_profile() to transition into the profile ‘libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac’ (the one virt-aa-helper loaded into the kernel in the previous step)
- When the VM is shutdown, libvirtd asks virt-aa-helper to remove the profile, and virt-aa-helper unloads the profile from the kernel
It should be noted that due to current limitations of AppArmor, only qemu:///system is confined by AppArmor. In practice, this is fine because qemu:///session is run as a normal user and does not have privileged access to the system like qemu:///system does.
Basic Usage
By default in Ubuntu 9.10, both AppArmor and the AppArmor security driver for libvirt are enabled, so users benefit from the AppArmor protection right away. To see if libvirtd is using the AppArmor security driver, do:
$ virsh capabilities
Connecting to uri: qemu:///system
<capabilities>
<host>
...
<secmodel>
<model>apparmor</model>
<doi>0</doi>
</secmodel>
</host>
...
</capabilities>
Next, start a VM and see if it is confined:
$ virsh start testqemu
Connecting to uri: qemu:///system
Domain testqemu started
$ virsh domuuid testqemu
Connecting to uri: qemu:///system
a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac
$ sudo aa-status
apparmor module is loaded.
16 profiles are loaded.
16 profiles are in enforce mode.
...
/usr/bin/virt-aa-helper
/usr/sbin/libvirtd
libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac
...
0 profiles are in complain mode.
6 processes have profiles defined.
6 processes are in enforce mode :
...
libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac (6089)
...
0 processes are in complain mode.
0 processes are unconfined but have a profile defined.
$ ps ww 6089
PID TTY STAT TIME COMMAND
6089 ? R 0:00 /usr/bin/qemu-system-x86_64 -S -M pc-0.11 -no-kvm -m 64 -smp 1 -name testqemu -uuid a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac -monitor unix:/var/run/libvirt/qemu/testqemu.monitor,server,nowait -boot c -drive file=/var/lib/libvirt/images/testqemu.img,if=ide,index=0,boot=on -drive file=,if=ide,media=cdrom,index=2 -net nic,macaddr=52:54:00:86:5b:6e,vlan=0,model=virtio,name=virtio.0 -net tap,fd=17,vlan=0,name=tap.0 -serial none -parallel none -usb -vnc 127.0.0.1:1 -k en-us -vga cirrus
Here is the unique, restrictive profile for this VM:
$ cat /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac
#
# This profile is for the domain whose UUID
# matches this file.
#
#include <tunables/global>
profile libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac {
#include <abstractions/libvirt-qemu>
#include <libvirt/libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac.files>
}
$ cat /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/libvirt-a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac.files
# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE DIRECTLY. IT IS MANAGED BY LIBVIRT.
"/var/log/libvirt/**/testqemu.log" w,
"/var/run/libvirt/**/testqemu.monitor" rw,
"/var/run/libvirt/**/testqemu.pid" rwk,
"/var/lib/libvirt/images/testqemu.img" rw,
Now shut it down:
$ virsh shutdown testqemu
Connecting to uri: qemu:///system
Domain testqemu is being shutdown
$ virsh domstate testqemu
Connecting to uri: qemu:///system
shut off
$ sudo aa-status | grep 'a22e3930-d87a-584e-22b2-1d8950212bac'
[1]
Advanced Usage
In general, you can forget about AppArmor confinement and just use libvirt like normal. The guests will be isolated from each other and user-space protection for the host is provided. However, the design allows for a lot of flexibility in the system. For example:
- If you want to adjust the profile for all future, newly created VMs, adjust /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt/TEMPLATE
- If you need to adjust access controls for all VMs, new or existing, adjust /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/libvirt-qemu
- If you need to adjust access controls for a single guest, adjust /etc/apparmor.d/libvirt-<uuid>, where <uuid> is the UUID of the guest
- To disable the driver, either adjust /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf to have ‘security_driver = “none”‘ or remove the AppArmor profile for libvirtd from the kernel and restart libvirtd
Of course, you can also adjust the profiles for libvirtd and virt-aa-helper if desired. All the files are simple text files. See AppArmor for more information on using AppArmor in general.
Limitations and the Future
While the sVirt framework provides good guest isolation and user-space host protection, the framework does not provide protection against in-kernel attacks (eg, where a guest process is able to access the host kernel memory). The AppArrmor security driver as included in Ubuntu 9.10 also does not handle access to host devices as well as it could. Allowing a guest to access a local pci device or USB disk is a potentially dangerous operation anyway, and the driver will block this access by default. Users can work around this by adjusting the base profile for the guest.
There are few missing features in the sVirt model, such as labeling state files. The AppArmor driver also needs to better support host devices. Once AppArmor provides the ability for regular users to define profiles, then qemu:///session can be properly supported. Finally, it will be great when distributions take advantage of libvirt’s recently added ability to run guests as non-root when using qemu:///system (while the sVirt framework largely mitigates this risk, it is good to have security in depth).
Summary
While cloud computing feels like it is talked about everywhere and virtualization becoming even more important in the data center, leveraging technologies like libvirt and AppArmor is a must. Virtualization removes the traditional barriers afforded to stand-alone computers, thus increasing the attack surface for hostile users and compromised guests. By using the sVirt framework in libvirt, and in particular AppArmor on Ubuntu 9.10, administrators can better defend themselves against virtualization-specific attacks. Have fun and be safe!
More Information
http://libvirt.org/
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/AppArmor
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Specifications/AppArmorLibvirtProfile